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Is the Search for God Fact(oid) or Fiction?
Forrest Clingerman
This essay opens with an presentation ofthe postmodern crises ofknowledge and method in
both the scientific and the theological disciplines. There is potentialfor science and theology to
work through these crises together. To do so, however, a new model ofrelating them needs to be
used. One such model is found in following the discipline of the interdisciplinary.
The Postmodern period began in the eighties,
with the American religious deliriums, in both
fundamentalist Christian and New Age forms,
and with the indulgence of the imaginary
anecdotes of Ronald Reagan and Tawana
Brawley; it achieved its apotheosis in O. J.
Simpson's acquittal. The salient questions in
this new era tend to the epistemological:
What do you know, and how do you think you
know it?
This quotation comes from a recent
article by Kurt Anderson, addressing the
factoid nature of the media; but it could just
as easily refer to the theological state of
affairs of Postmodern America. Instead of
the cool assurance of Aquinas or even the
liberal theology of the turn of the century,
we have, to borrow from the subtitle of
Anderson's article, been welcomed to the
theological factual free-for-all.
This precarious place of factual
uncertainty can be seen in the epistemic
crisis that seems to be inherent in any new
theological endeavor. Perhaps the greatest
contribution to theology in the past twenty
years has been David Tracy's work, which
has helped otherwise-lost theologians find
their way through the mire of a method-
ological nightmare. In essence, the problem
is this: how does theology, which no longer
has an unassailable epistemological founda-
tion, reconfigure itself in order fully to
comprehend the divine? This is a theologi-
cal identity crisis of our time.
Part of this identity crisis has come
from the postmodern agenda that has been
championed for the last few decades. In a
rather vitriolic article, Margaret Archer
explains the theological allure of
postmodernism: "In short, postmodernists
denounce modernity which to them is the
embodiment of secular scientific rational-
ism, therefore some theologians feel an
elective affinity with opponents of their
enemy." 2 If postmodernism, with its post-
foundationalist and post-rationalist views,
has led innocent theologians into the abyss,
it has succeeded in making the "Enlighten-
ment Project" seem at least tenuous, if not
downright ludicrous. Theology has become
much like a carpenter who spends most of
her or his free time fixing the foundation of
the house. It may be easier just to build a
new foundation, but the problem is that there
is a house sitting on top of the cellar hole.
The accretions of theological tradition are
some of the tools with which we must work,
but that tradition is not entirely consistent.
Thus, the foundation of our theological
structure is in constant need of repair.
Theology is not the only discipline that
is currently going through the tremors of
uncertainty. In essence, we have become
more unsure of the "reality" that science
portrays. All the while, science continues to
make amazing strides in its predictive
ability-which for most of us comes in the
form of technology. Public sympathy
toward the miracle-working science of the
twentieth century is swiftly coming to a
close, leaving behind a culture that is not
entirely sure of the values of science, while
mainlining its technological wares. The
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environmental crisis, cloning, and the
products of the defense industry are topics in
which science has shown its ethical ambiva-
lence-and every day in the living room and
in local pubs, new debates ernerge. While
we may not see science as the best thing
since the days of unsliced bread, we
Theology has become much like a carpenter
who spends most ofherfree time fixing the
foundation of her house. It may be easier
just to build a newfoundation, but the prob-
lem is that there is a house sitting on top of
the cellar-hole.
certainly see it as giving us an ever-increas-
ing fix of our electronic high. So, novels
from William Gibson and Douglas Coupland
are filled with the curse and the blessing of
our ill-fated love affair-with science, from its
incomprehensible highs to its crushing,
destructive lows.
Like the crisis of theology, the crisis of
science comes from its own making. This
does not come strictly from philosophy of
science, although the works of recent
philosophers have helped. Kuhn and
Lakatos are among the most prominent.
More influential have been the unique
contributions of twentieth-century science,
which have helped create the scientific
epistemological quagmire. One example
that can be quickly pointed out is the dispute
over the interpretation of quantum theory. 3
In his book, Nature, Reality, and the Sacred,
Langdon Gilkey gives us another example.
Gilkey writes of an incongruency in many
current scientific cosmologies, such as those
of Sagan, Hawking, and Pagels. On the one
hand, these self-assured authors embody
propositions that are "characteristic of an
older (in fact, nineteenth-century), now
frequently repudiated, 'objectivist' under-
standing of science, and therefore challenge
directly the new understanding of science." 4
This is the same viewpoint that many of the
popular media hold of science. On the other
hand, many scientists have begun to brush
off their college philosophy texts in order to
deal with the epistemological problem of the
century-old "new science." Gilkey notes
this as the realization of the hermeneutical
character of science. Gilkey writes, "Never-
theless, from my limited reading of scien-
tific cosmologies, it appears that the word of
this breakthrough in the philosophy of
1 science has not reached





science is no longer the
island of certainty in a
I sea of wishy-washy
humanities. In fact,
science seems to be floating above the sea of
reality like the rest of the academic world. 6
"What do you know, and how do you
know it?" Our desire to know God may not
come from the latest book on theology—in
fact, more often than not, it does not. At the
same time, I am sure that more people on the
street where I live get their science lessons
from watching "The X-Files" on television
than from perusing the works of Kuhn,
Lakatos, or Einstein. Similarly, much of the
academic world has been led down a dark
alley that may increase an oversaturated
publishing market but does not help in
finding the way to a better understanding of
God.
As can be surmised from this thought,
this paper seeks to examine the theological
crisis, although the scientific crisis plays a
part in the discussion. Epistemology is
reliant on method-thus, an epistemic crisis
implicitly leads to a methodological one. It
is to this point I would now like to turn.
Methodological crisis
I once saw a sign for a Bible study that
read: "Religion and Science: Do you have
to leave your brain outside the sanctuary
door?" For April Fools' Day, I think I might
put this same sign on a lab door, changing
the word "sanctuary" to "laboratory."
Although this would be amusing, there is
some truth to answering "yes" to both
questions. In a sense, you do have to leave
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your "brain" at the door of both the lab and
the sanctuary. The sense in which this is
true comes from a facet of our thinking—
namely, that ever-ubiquitous "method" that
seems to be the bus driver for the Western
academic route. Like any bus driver, Mr.
Method knows to cut the route up, to stop
only at given corners to let people out. If
you would like to see something that is not
on the route, you have to figure out how to
get there. If you only take the bus, you may
miss the fluidity of the surroundings. In
other words, there is a place between the
stop at the supermarket and the one at the
bank, but the bus cannot take you there. Our
methods determine our outcome. This is
something that physics has discovered with
wave/particle duality (to mention only one
example); it is certainly not exclusive to
science, however.
In a more erudite way, Albert Camus
made this point in The Myth ofSisyphus:
"For methods imply metaphysics; uncon-
sciously they disclose conclusions that they
often claim not to know yet. Similarly, the
last pages of a book are already contained in
the first pages. Such a link is inevitable." 7
This point is hardly a revelation in either
religion or science. Further, there is a
conscious link between epistemology and
method; an epistemic goal implies a method.
Since the epistemological crisis of our time
is becoming more obvious, this also means a
concomitant methodological crisis on our
worldview. Again, this point is hardly a
revelation. However, it is important to
understand it, in order to negotiate the ways
in which science and religion inform us
about the divine. This leads to the crux of
this paper. How can religion and science
help each other out of the crisis in which
they both appear to be embedded? The
answer to this question points to the answer
to another: How can science lead to
information about the divine? This question
might be addressed by raising the possibility
that it is through a new understanding of
"the theology act" that a more cogent
method, and thus a more cogent epistemol-
ogy, will emerge.
A way out of the crisis, together
There is an epistemological crisis, and
epistemology is intricately tied to our
methodological foundation. Thus far, we
have seen that neither science nor religion
has necessarily given us a trustworthy basis
for finding God, if left to their own devices.
The next step that must be taken is finding a
new relationship toward theological method
that will help in our quest of faith-a
relationship that will reassert a methodologi-
cal foundation. This new relationship, I
believe, will have two consequences. First,
it will give us a view of science and theol-
ogy that does not suffer from the same
epistemic tremors—in other words, a kinder,
gentler theology and science. Second, and
perhaps more germane to our final destina-
tion, this new relationship will help us
understand how science can be beneficial in
our theological search for God.
The first step is always the hardest, of
course. In order even to attempt a new
relationship with theological method, the
relationship between theology and God must
be clarified, or at least made slightly less
murky. What does the gibberish of a
theological text have to do with God?
Envision two boxers beating each other
(much as a student engages Aquinas). When
the dust clears and a bloody glove is held up
by the referee, victory appears. However,
where does victory come from when it
enters the situation? How does victory
come about?
Theology as a discipline is not properly
a large, tree-lined avenue to God. It is,
instead, one large question mark (or many
different question marks). Theology is a call
and a response, and it is only in the response
that it gains any recognizable connection
with the divine. Certainly, the most obvious
example is the case in which God becomes
part of liberation theology through Latin
American base communities. But if we stop
there, we are selling ourselves short. God
also becomes part of theology through the
act of recognition: as we see ourselves and
our world within theological structure, the
divine element of theology takes shape.
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Properly speaking, theology is not simply Three ineffective models
the formulating and systematizing, but is the That science is necessary for theology is
integration of the system into our not some startling insight; rather, it is an
worldview. Theology's relationship with emphasis that should be fostered. Our
God is in the potential of a divine resonance knowledge of the world is a unitary whole,
within our systematic view of reality, via our and theology and science can deliver a
action stemming from, and our reaction to, portion of that knowledge. However, our
our theology. relationship with God is not formulated
This view of theology gives us a lens through simplistic academic parceling,
through which to view the epistemic crisis. Thus, an appreciation of the theological
After all, if religion is not entirely sure of its view of a resonance between God and our
foundations, most likely this situation is worldview requires the traditional theologi-
attributable to a lack of resonance between cal formulations to be transformed by
God and our worldview. That malfunction, scientific understanding. Since many
in turn, derives from the disintegration of theological programs attempt to use scien-
theology's ability fully to evoke the question tific understanding in theology, if might be
and response, this divine resonance with our beneficial to point out some lines of thought
worldview. Of course, any statement like that attempt this connection, and to explain
this should be qualified. Some theology why these lines are not implied in the
does an admirable job; much of the time, argument made here. First, consider what
though, it does not reach the pulpit and the might be termed the "awe and wonder
street corner (unless the corner happens to factor." Usually this is propounded by those
have a group of seminary students at it). So, in the scientific community, particularly
the standard "neither the scope or size of the those who are not aligned with any specific
present work" qualification must, unfortu- religious tradition. While the "awe and
nately, be applied here. wonder" that occur when a scientist surveys
However, we are still left enough room the order and complexity of the universe is
to apply this understanding of theology to indeed awesome and wonderful, this a
our present situation. In viewing theology theological statement does not make. The
and its problems in this light, as well as "awe and wonder factor" is not sufficient to
seeing that science can not deliver any rebuild a theological understanding,
epistemic certainty to our overall worldview, A second line of thought, in which




" While the "awe and wonder" that occur when
could be drawn is that a scientist surveys the order and complexity
these fields must be ,^ un{yerse may in(Jeed fa awesome and
somehow reintegrated. J J
This reintegration wonderful, this a theological statement does
would bring the not ma^.
various pieces of the
pie back together.
When theology is practiced in this way, it attempt to show how theology can be
not only seeks the divine, but reaches the considered to be a scientific discipline. An
crossroads of thought and action. To check excellent example of this is Nancey
the score on the argument thus far, it reads: Murphy's work, Theology in an Age of
science is necessary to complete the Scientific Reasoning, in Which she seeks to
theological act. show that theology can be considered as a
Lakatosian research program. To say that
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this is not an acceptable possibility in the
current circumstance is not meant as a
disparagement of Murphy's work—the
clarity and erudition of the volume would
make this difficult. But the effort is simply
a mixing of apples and oranges. The
definition of theology which I would like to
present is not determined by the viability of
theology as a scientific program. Similarly,
the question of whether theology is such a
discipline does not rest on the current
argument.
Finally, the third line of thought is the
segregated-knowledge argument. An
example of this can be found in Langdon
Gilkey's work, in which he describes the
separate forms of scientific and theological
knowledge. The problem with this argument
is that it confuses differing methods—or
maps to knowledge-with the knowledge
itself. Assuming that knowledge is a unitary
whole, I am suggesting something that
contradicts the theory that there are different
"types" of knowledge. There is absolutely
nothing fundamentally different between the
knowledge given by science and that given
by theology. Admittedly, each discipline's
questions and methods differ, and thus each
gives different answers; but each is funda-
mental for our overall view of reality. In
effect, the difference that arises is in the
mode of knowing, rather than the knowledge
itself.
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The interdisciplinary as a new model
If these three possibilities do not
encompass what this synthesis of religion
and science means, they are still indicators
of what it means. In conclusion, the final
thrust of the argument is this: that we must
rediscover the interdisciplinary as discipline.
A synthesis means finding the interdiscipli-
nary as the discipline of seeking the divine.
While both science and theology ask
questions in their own respective ways, it is
only through a "coming together" that the
theological act can truly be completed. In
many respects, this is already being done.
We see the role of our faith when we
understand how God's creation is degraded
through clear-cutting or strip-mining. We
feel the presence of God when we hear the
cry of a baby that is born healthy in a
modern hospital. We can only pray for the
mercy of God when we see that we have
built the weapons that kill people thousands
of miles away. Each of these examples
portrays the theological act in an intuitive
way—and each reflects both science and
religion. In addition to the theological
viewpoints we have, science gives us new
ways of viewing the world that are inte-
grated into our knowledge of the divine. As
we seek to find a way out of the epistemic
maze without meeting up with the Minotaur,
we will need to rely on all of our knowledge.
Science gives us new ways to act, just as
theology does. Through them, the theologi-
cal act can be completed and the presence of
the divine brought among us.
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3Although many writers have tackled this
subject in detail, a brief exposition may be
found in chapter 2 of Nick Herbert's book,
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8This discussion is regrettably brief and
deserves a paper unto itself. My thought on
the subject has been formed, in part, by my
studies in Buddhism, particularly Kitaro
Nishida's work, An Inquiry into the Good.
Forrest Clingerman received his M.Div. degree in 1997 from Boston University School
of Theology. He currently works as Operations Manager for The Boston Theological
Institute. His religious tradition is United Methodist.
This essay received a Second Prize.
22 Journal ofFaith and Science Exchange, 1997
